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AbstrAct Though dissatisfied with some management practices and working conditions,
like most high-tech knowledge workers, videogame developers remain reluctant towards union-
ization. This article examines the factors of collective action among developers as an example,
using data gathered from an international survey and interviews. We conclude that developers
meet some conditions conducive to collective action but face many obstacles as well, both to
collective action and to unionization proper. This does not lead us to share the belief of a decline
in collective action, but rather raises the issue of conflating union action and collective action.
Our study reveals how unsuited the general North American trade union system is to their sit-
uation, as it is to project-based environments and knowledge workers in general.
KeyWords  Film/video policy; Videogame developers; Working conditions; Project-based
organizations; Unionization
rÉsUMÉ Bien que pratiques de gestion et conditions de travail provoquent de l’insatisfaction
chez les concepteurs de jeux vidéo, ils demeurent réticents devant la syndicalisation, comme les
travailleurs du savoir en général. Cet article étudie les facteurs de l’action collective chez les
concepteurs, en utilisant les données d’un sondage international et des entrevues. Nous
concluons que les concepteurs satisfont certaines conditions menant à l’action collective mais
rencontrent aussi plusieurs obstacles qui s’opposent parfois à l’action collective mais plus encore
à la syndicalisation à proprement parler. Cela ne permet pas de conclure au déclin de l’action
collective, mais plutôt d’interroger le bien-fondé d’assimiler syndicalisation et action collective.
L’étude révèle plutôt un régime syndical Nord-américain mal adapté à leur situation autant
qu’à l’organisation par projets et à l’économie du savoir en général.
Mots cLÉs Politique du cinéma et de la vidéo; Concepteurs de jeux vidéo; Conditions de
travail; Organisation par projets; Syndicalisation
Introduction
the late 20th century was marked by a decline in national unionization rates (especially
in the private sector) and very low rates of unionization in emerging sectors of the econ-
omy, such as high-tech industries (Milton, 2003). some have interpreted this phenom-
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enon as evidence that trade unions are less relevant to highly skilled professionals, who
are individualistic, mobile and career-focused (bassett & cave, 1993). others call for
unions to adapt and replace confrontation with greater cooperation with businesses’
economic success (Kochan & osterman, 1994). some have gone further and argued
that new media professionals are really entrepreneurs and should not be subject to the
government rules that apply to hourly employees, including unionization (cohn, 2001).
In fact, the labour laws of many U.s. states and some canadian provinces either exclude
“high technology professionals” from standards regulating payment for overtime or
make particular adjustments to those standards in the name of ﬂexibility.
Videogame developers (VGds) are one such occupational group. Like many high-
tech and cultural knowledge workers, they work in project-based environments, are
highly skilled (98% have completed some form of post-secondary education), well
paid (they earn 150-200% more than average workers of comparable education in
canada) and highly mobile. the videogame industry is often criticized for the violent
and sexist content of mainstream games, but it has also received public attention for
labour abuses. Most common are issues of work-life balance and the long and formally
uncompensated hours of overtime or “crunch” (deuze, bowen chase & Allen, 2007;
de Peuter & dyer-Witheford, 2005; dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2006; Legault &
ouellet, 2012; Legault & Weststar, 2012, 2013; Weststar & Legault, 2012). challenges
around intellectual property and crediting standards, non-compete and non-disclosure
agreements, health and safety (i.e., stress, burnout, intoxication, and musculoskeletal
disorders) are other common concerns (Legault & ouellet, 2012).
We have documented some dissatisfaction with these practices; yet, like most
high-tech knowledge workers, VGds remain reluctant towards unionization (Milton,
2003; Haiven, 2006), and this raises a number of questions. How do individuals acquire
a sense of collective—as opposed to individual—grievance? How, and under what con-
ditions, do individuals organize collectively to pursue their grievances, or interests?
How, and under what conditions, will such individuals take collective action—that is,
cooperative action taken by a number of individuals acting in concert and with com-
mon goals? these questions are raised by Kelly (1998) as the central problems of the
ﬁeld of labour relations. In this article, we apply Kelly’s mobilization theory to examine
the likelihood of mobilization or collective action among VGds. First, using data gath-
ered from an international survey, we show that VGds are divided on the idea of union-
izing. to interpret this raw data and test Kelly’s determinants for mobilization we
analyze additional survey data and interviews conducted with VGds in Montréal.
We conclude that VGds meet some conditions conducive to collective action. First,
they have identiﬁed common problems in industry working conditions. second, they
have developed a professional community with which they identify. yet, an examina-
tion of other conditions of Kelly’s model reveals a number of obstacles, both to collec-
tive action and to unionization proper. this does not lead us to share the belief of a
decline in collective action; it rather raises the issue of the univocal nature of Kelly’s
mobilization theory, which conﬂates union action and collective action. our study of
VGds reveals how unsuited the general North American trade union system is to their
situation and to project-based environments and knowledge workers in general.
Context and theoretical framework
In 2009 the International Game developers Association (IGdA) asked the following
question on their second survey measuring quality of life in the industry: “some de-
velopers feel the only way to improve the quality of life in this industry is to join a
union. If a vote were taken today, how would you vote?” the 2506 responses among
the international sample of developers were divided in three thirds; 35 percent would
vote for the union, 31 percent would vote against, and 34 percent avoided this contro-
versial topic by choosing “no opinion or prefer not to say.” Given declining unioniza-
tion rates, the degree of union support was surprising. the emerging risk society (beck,
1992) is often seen as an economy in which individuals assume greater responsibility
for protecting themselves, counting less on state support. It is assumed there are fewer
manifestations of collective material interests, simply because less collective conscious-
ness exists (bassett & cave, 1993; brown, 1990).
Kelly (1998) notes that a collective interest can however exist in the absence of
any such manifestation because the mobilization of that collective interest requires a
speciﬁc supporting framework. Kelly’s mobilisation theory remains a prominent meta-
model that engages with and builds on previous models of smaller scope (i.e., the mod-
els of Gamson, MacAdam, olson, & tilly) in an attempt to reconcile and aggregate
their most common and relevant features to account for the macro-social reality of
mobilization and build predictive power under a new framework (Kelly, 1998).
According to his observations, ﬂuctuations in worker mobilization mirror the eco-
nomic rhythms of capitalism, which periodically cause economic situations that pro-
voke collective action. throughout this article we will test the experiences of VGds
against this mobilization theory to better understand their propensity and opportunity
to engage in collective action.
Mobilization theory presents four determinants that must all be satisﬁed to result
in collective action (see Figure 1). the ﬁrst determinant is derived from social move-
ment theory. Here, the interests of individual actors must come to be: a) framed against
those of a ruling group, and b) framed as collective. this is attained when people no
longer believe in the legitimacy of the status quo and the attempts of ruling groups to
legitimate their actions no longer succeed. More than dissatisfaction, a sense of injus-
tice is needed to trigger collective action (i.e., the violation of established rules or a
breach of equilibrium in the wage-effort exchange). As a consequence of deﬁning the
situation as illegitimate, workers in subordinate positions feel entitled to their demands
and align no longer with the ruling group, but with fellow subordinates.
three processes are important in reaching the above determinant of collective in-
terest: attribution, social identiﬁcation and leadership (Kelly, 1998). through attribu-
tion, the injustice is blamed on an “other” as something under his/her/its control.
through social identiﬁcation, individuals aggregate as an “in-group” (us) positioned
in opposition to an “out-group” (them). In most cases, leaders initiate and facilitate
the social construction of attribution and social identiﬁcation.
the second determinant is the organizational structure of the group vis-à-vis its
capacity for collective action (Kelly, 1998). Kelly uses examples from unionized envi-
ronments but is broadly referring to the connectivity and communication capacity of
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the group. successful mobilization can hinge on the quality of communication chan-
nels, the degree and nature of interaction among members, and the density and
strength of social networks.
In Kelly’s cumulative model, the third determinant becomes primed once the pre-
vious two are met: actors have deﬁned their interests as a collective and reached a suf-
ﬁcient degree of organization. the third step is the actual mobilization. It is the process
by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action or
the ways in which individuals are transformed into a collective actor. However mobi-
lization itself requires additional enablers: a favourable cost-beneﬁt assessment, lead-
ership, and social interaction.
the fourth and last determinant is the opportunity to engage in collective action.
opportunity is based on the balance of power between the parties, the costs of repres-
sion by the ruling group (i.e., the employer), and the avenues and procedures that are
available for subordinate groups to pursue their claims (i.e., alternative actions, sup-
portive labour laws, or societal norms). 
Under this model, collective action as an end result can take different forms ac-
cording to the balance between perception of interests, organization of the group, mo-
bilization, and opportunity for action. It is important to note that Kelly’s model takes
union action as the height of collective action in the workplace. the actions given as
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of Kelly’s mobilization model
Interests
• Sense of injustice (perception of
illegitimacy of status quo)
• Attribution of injustice against an ‘other’
• Social indentification around that
injustice as ‘us’ versus ‘them’
Organization
• Degree of communication and decision-
making structures/networks
• Quality of those structures/networks
Opportunity
• Balance of power
between the parties
• Costs of repressions by
the ruling group
• External supports for
subordinate groups to
pursue their claims (i.e.,
laws, societal norms)
Mobilization
• Leadership (also needed for interests
and organization above)
• Cost-benefit estimations
• Social interaction and peer pressure
exemplars are those used by trade unions: strikes, overtime bans, go-slows, working
to rule, petitions, lobbying, and collective appeals (Kelly, 1998). However, as our analy-
sis will show, a focus on traditional forms of unionization as the endpoint of successful
collective mobilization may be a limiting feature in Kelly’s model.
Data
two sets of data inform our discussion of the propensity for video game developers to
mobilize under Kelly’s model. the ﬁrst is the aforementioned data from the 2009
Quality of Life (QoL) survey that was administered by the IGdA (hereafter referred to
as the 2009 QoL survey). the total international sample size is 3362 and includes game
developers in a variety of employment relationships; however, a number of the ques-
tions used in this article were only asked to the 2153 VGds employed full- or part-time
(Legault & Weststar, 2012; 2013). the second is a set of 53 interviews of salaried VGds
working in various studios in Montréal, Québec, conducted in the summer of 2008.
the sample contains roughly equal numbers of men and women and is otherwise gen-
erally representative of the demographics of VGds. Montréal has 80 percent of the
videogame employment in Québec (corbeil, 2012) and Québec has half of the
videogame employment in canada (esAc, 2011).
Analysis
Interests: Collective injustice and attributions of blame
Unlike traditional organizations where employees work in the same geographical loca-
tion and unions are certiﬁed on an enterprise basis, VGds show evidence of an occupa-
tionally-based collective identity. due to the project-based nature of the industry, VGds
often have portfolio careers with high mobility (Weststar, 2013). As a result, VGds often
have weak ties to any particular studio and strong ties to the speciﬁc games they have
made and the developers with whom they have worked. the IGdA is the professional
association for the trade and facilitates the development of communities of practice
among VGds. In these ways, VGds are typical of project-based knowledge workers, cre-
ative workers, and emerging technical professionals where the occupation is the nexus
for collectivity (barley & Kunda, 2006). Workers across geographical and organizational
boundaries are united through the shared language and norms of their craft. this oc-
cupational community of VGds is further reinforced through a shared culture of games
and gaming. therefore, VGds do form an “in-group” that is deﬁned occupationally on
an international basis and is positioned against “out-groups” such as the work in other
entertainment mediums or other jobs that programmers or artists might do.
We have formerly published accounts of the challenging working conditions and
labour process of game development and related ﬁelds, and it is out of scope to re-
produce those here (see also chandler, 2009; deuze, et al., 2007; IGdA, 2004; Kerr,
2011; Kline, dyer-Witheford & de Peuter, 2003; Legault, 2013; Legault & ouellet, 2012;
McGuire & chadwicke Jenkins, 2009). rather, we will start from the premise that is-
sues exist and could be perceived as injustices. the questions for mobilization theory
are whether issues such as unlimited unpaid overtime (UUo) are indeed seen as an
injustice against the collective and whether the source of that injustice can be attrib-
uted to another group (i.e., the employer). regarding the ﬁrst, UUo is certainly an
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acknowledged source of dissatisfaction. the 2004 IGdA QoL survey found that 86.2
percent of respondents could not see themselves keeping up the same pace of work
due to repercussions among friends and family and a high rate of burnout (IGdA,
2004). Illegitimacy also arises because refusing overtime has consequences in the
form of negative performance appraisals and exclusion from the peer network. this
can damage professional reputations in an industry characterized by mobility and
frequent replacement:
I don’t really know people who won’t work the overtime. because if you’re
on a team, let’s say if the programmer refuses to work overtime, the game
doesn’t get ﬁnished for that day and doesn’t get sent to the people at head-
quarters who have to review it every couple of days and he gets blamed.
No I don’t think you really can. you can but you’d probably be ﬁred
quickly. … I know I get evaluated every six months and I know it will affect
my evaluation if people perceived me as being the girl that doesn’t go the
extra mile. (F-10-16-G-26-06-08-01-07)
some interpret sufﬁcient injustice so as to begin to speak about change through col-
lective action:
I wanted the overtime to be justiﬁed. I wanted to be paid, and of course,
you can ask the employer, but obviously he’ll say he’s entitled. And then
when you call later for help, there is none, and then you don’t want to bat-
tle a giant like those huge companies on your own. obviously a class action
is needed. It takes a torchbearer. No employee will do it. that’s usually the
union’s role. but we don’t have one here. (H-13-08-U-03-06-08-01-07)
It is not, however, universally considered an injustice for a number of reasons. For
one, according to the 2009 QoL survey a majority of developers (64%) are poorly or
not informed about labour laws in their country or region. thus, they are far from know-
ing whether their situation is legitimate or not. Further, 40 percent do not know if the
labour laws where they live offer sufﬁcient protection should a grievance arise between
an employer and employee. to take the example of the legislative framework in Québec,
the Act respecting Labour standards (rsQ, c.  N-1.1, ss.  52–55) states that employees
may be required to work overtime, in exchange for a premium of at least 50 percent of
the prevailing hourly wage, if the employer asks them to. conversely, an employer that
does not wish to pay for overtime cannot require it. therefore, game studio practices
are legally ambiguous, because supervisors do not actually ask VGds to work overtime
and maintain that it is never required, but that VGds do it of their own volition. to
avoid controversy over compensation, extra hours are called crunch time rather than
overtime, thus presenting it as a project management constraint, rather than a man-
agement request. Worse, some VGds are asked to sign timesheets showing 40 hours,
no matter how many they have actually worked or no logs are kept at all.
Neither purely voluntary and willingly agreed, nor required and forced, overtime
of this kind falls into the biggest category of “willingly agreed, but strongly expected”
(campbell, 2002, p. 141). In this manner the unstated expectation of management be-
comes rooted in the organizational and industry cultures, and indeed the occupational
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ethos, of making games. In the 2009 QoL survey, one-third of respondents felt that
crunch was a necessary part of game development. that said, 79 percent of those who
crunched often as part of regular studio practice felt that it was illegitimate (i.e., they
viewed it as a failure in scheduling or ﬂatly disagreed with the practice). the result is
a conﬂicted response on behalf of VGds:
you know, especially at the end of a project, they try to get people to put
in just a bit more extra effort. … the company doesn’t make me do the
hours. I do it because I want to. but at the same time, the constraints of
working in videogames mean that it’s hard to get ahead without doing it
[overtime]. (H-01-16-U-29-05-08-01-07)
As well, workers may perceive these environments as motivating and satisfying be-
cause challenging assignments are often occasions of learning and opportunities to en-
rich one’s portfolio (dessler, 1999). In this way, many VGds seem like willing conspirators
in their own exploitation (Mcrobbie, 2002) as long as they are creatively respected:
that’s pretty [much] what seals the deal, if a project is interesting enough,
people would put up with anything, they will work crazy hours if they love
the project … so people will go “oh yeah, it’s going to be a great game.”
so they use that, a company uses that to make people do more work than
they should do … . sometimes they use that to exploit you so they don’t
pay you as much … they know you like it, so they don’t have to pay you
because they know you’ll do it anyway, they know you’ll accept it. … If
I’m working for a project that I put my own personal stamp on, that I in-
vested in, [overtime’s] sort of my choice. (H-13-11-A-17-06-08-01-07)
In a star system where reputation is the key to mobility, VGds are all the more
willing to accept poor conditions on a project if it enables them to acquire skills and
eventually be associated with a hit. thus VGds are driven by an informal system of re-
wards and punishments in the form of boosts or impediments to career development,
especially in studios aiming for AAA game hits. to add to this uneven interpretation
of illegitimate working conditions, big stars are able to individually impose conditions
and therefore often arrive at quite satisfactory, yet exclusive, arrangements (Legault &
ouellet, 2012). As well, some studios work very hard to avoid crunch or rule it with
transparent policies.
once a collective injustice is perceived, it is necessary to attribute that illegiti-
macy—to ﬁnd someone to blame. this is again an uneven application among VGds.
team leads, senior managers and often owners are included in the “us” of the occupa-
tional community and studio hierarchies are often quite ﬂat. It is therefore more difﬁ-
cult to parse out the “them” to blame. As well, some VGds do not blame the employer
at all. For those who do, the criticisms are associated with a lack of voice in setting the
schedule, lack of control over the scope of the project, and reduced budgets or staff in
the face of escalating expectations:
so they have trouble coming to see us and saying: “right, I’ve got a job to
be done. How long will it take you?” When they’re planning, they put
down that it’s going to take a day, when we know damn well it’ll take two
Legault & Weststar Mobilization in Cultural Work 209
or three days. so we wind up with plans that are absolutely never followed.
And towards the end of production, when the deadline looms, you can’t
put it off: it’s the customer’s deadline. (F-13-19-A-23-07-08-01-07)
the feeling of illegitimacy is increased in the face of successful games with large proﬁts
or when the game developers feel that they are under-resourced or are being
knowingly exploited by their managers:
team budgets are getting smaller and smaller and producers take it for
granted that people will do overtime. they shorten the timeline, they do
it on purpose to ﬁt the most possible into a shorter time. (F-10-12-U-12-05-
08-01-07)
risk management is a large component of project management and involves plan-
ning to account for and mitigate threats to the project’s immutable schedule (as set
by the publisher and/or senior management). Project managers have to estimate the
time needed to meet the deadlines with uneven resources and avoid project failure. It
is common for management to incorrectly anticipate risks, and therefore rely on
crunch to save the project. For example, one programmer (F-13-19-A-23-07-08-01-07)
complained that 80 percent of her time was spent on the upkeep of the computer (i.e.,
downed servers, slow networks, broken parts) as opposed to new work, yet the time
needed for these regular events was not accounted for in the schedule. As another de-
veloper said, “there are projects that go wrong because people underestimated the dif-
ﬁculty or planned poorly” and he further suggested that the project-based
environment is not sympathetic to such errors, “[d]eadlines don’t get pushed back be-
cause of a mistake like that” (H-06-05-U-05-06-08-01-07).
the more experience employees have, the more they tend to blame overtime on
poor project management as opposed to “the way it is in games.” Many commented
on the inability to refuse customer requests after the contract is signed. resources are
assigned to the project according to the parameters of the contract terms, which are
grounded in the terms of the agreement. customer change requests should theoreti-
cally have an impact on contract terms (i.e., extended budget or time), but in practice
that is uncommon: 
In the other cases of overtime, when the publisher says: “oh, can we have
this?”—“can we have that?”—“We don’t like that.”—“this doesn’t work
anymore.”—“We’re gonna change this” so that has a huge impact on the
production because it’s not something that’s planned and it’s usually some-
thing that comes very late and the reason why it happens is usually that the
… licence holders or any sort of third party owner of this intellectual property
might only get involved towards the very end of the project, so then that’s
when things start getting really messy. (F-12-16-A-16-06-08-01-07)
these quotations demonstrate a challenge with attributing blame in a project-
based environment. Local management of the project is the responsibility of the pro-
ducer or project manager; however, they are subject to the decisions of senior
management within the studio and also parties external to the studio—the most im-
portant being the client or editor when the studio is a second or third party. As the
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point of blame becomes more removed from the developer, it becomes easy to see the
problems as too big, systemic, unchallengeable, or “just the way it is”:
[When you consider the question of hours …] It’s not just the company,
it’s the whole industry. the industry is aggressive, highly competitive. you
always have to try and stand out. of course, the company I’m with is one
of the top ﬁve in the world. Just to stay in the top ﬁve, you have to be de-
manding, have a great catalogue that will attract players, that will sell, that
will be fun, so there’s a lot. (F-01-01-U-31-07-08-01-07)
Unlike mass production, the full details of the process and, to some extent, the
exact outcome that can be achieved, are unknown. every game created must be dif-
ferent from those preceding it and make full use of available technological possibilities.
the uncertainty inherent in estimating the time needed to achieve a creative result
makes many salaried VGds sound like entrepreneurs deciding how many hours to
work based on the importance of product quality:
so if I didn’t do it [overtime] and no one else did it, it wouldn’t show in
the ﬁnal product and we have a certain amount of pride and a certain at-
tachment to the ﬁnal product, the common goal. so it’s not just repetitive
work delivering a certain number of products, it’s the quality of the ﬁnal
product. (F-18-02-U-22-07-08-01-07)
In this same entrepreneurial mindset, some VGds include themselves or their team
members in the blame for failed projects or long hours:
It’s a young industry, so we still don’t think about how to properly plan a
game yet. We wouldn’t need to do as much overtime if we’d plan things
better. Generally we don’t really know what we are doing a lot … Like we
know how to make the game, but … things change all the time and right
at the very last minute and I think it’s maybe lack of experience, we still
sort of rush in, rush in, right to the last, last bit. so that causes these extra
crunch times. (F-05-20-U-25-06-08-01-07)
Organization
on one hand, VGds are well organized under Kelly’s deﬁnition in that they have estab-
lished structures and the capacity to communicate quickly and broadly. the IGdA is an
international professional association that commits to “advocate on behalf of our mem-
bership to ensure quality of life, perpetuation of our craft and preparing the next gener-
ation of developers” (n.p.). Under the IGdA banner are about 90 local chapters, which
exist in most cities with game development clusters, and special interest groups (sIGs)
on key topics. Face-to-face meetings and Facebook discussions are facilitated through
the semi-autonomous local chapters. sIGs tend to operate through email distribution
lists and forums, although they will also host panels and meetings at game conferences.
the industry also has a number of trade associations such as the electronic software
Association (Us & canada), the Independent Games development Association (UK)
and the european Games developer Federation. However, these groups tend to focus
less on workers’ issues than on building a competitive global industry. the industry has
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also spawned a plethora of online electronic magazines and blogs that report on all as-
pects of game development and game play (i.e., Gamasutra). these sites publish articles
written by game developers and act as open forums for discussions and opinions.
through these channels and social media, word travels fast (shirky, 2008).
on the other hand, VGds face an organizational challenge to mobilizing because
existing groups and associations rely heavily on volunteers to conceive and execute
activities. this severely limits organizational capacity. Like their medieval forebears,
modern guilds focus on sharing knowledge—networking, providing services, and help-
ing their membership anticipate and capitalize on changing industry trends. this re-
quires building close ties with employers and does not facilitate the “us-them”
dichotomies required by Kelly’s mobilization theory and found in “traditional” labour
relations (benner, 2003). For instance, IGdA membership fees are often paid by studios.
Many VGds do not see the IGdA as capable of making changes to the working condi-
tions in the industry, nor do they seem to demand that intervention:
I see professional associations as more for providing tools, training, advice,
things like that. I see them more as a community of people working in the
same occupation who can talk and discuss the subject. I don’t really see
them as backing me in case of problems. A professional association isn’t
like a trade union, either. It’s really a group of people who do the same
job, who may be able to give me cues here and there for getting ahead,
tools to do the job better. (F-01-20-U-06-06-08-01-07)
Without the steward systems typical in trade unions, it is difﬁcult to accurately
monitor on-the-ground issues at individual studios. Professional associations also do
not have the legal backing to engage in more than public peer pressure. that said, de-
pending on the personalities and inclinations of its executive director and volunteers
at any given time, the IGdA has shown leadership on important debates such as work-
ing conditions. they have issued public statements to rogue studios, collected and
published data on the conditions of the industry (such as the QoL surveys).
Mobilization
Much of the lack of mobilization seen among VGds can be attributed to the cost-ben-
eﬁt analysis of Kelly’s model. Many game developers see few beneﬁts and perceive
many costs to becoming unionized. one strong hindrance is the high individual bar-
gaining power of VGds that is rooted in a favourable job market. For the time being at
least, many VGds, especially those with highly demanded skills and reputations, don’t
see any added value to a union:
I think that right now, people don’t feel they need a union. Why? because
there’s a lot of work. you don’t need to defend yourself. even though there
are disparities between some … people who do the same job, there’s still
great satisfaction with pay, because it’s driven by market pressures. We’ve
got the long end of the stick. (H-12-16-16-A-04-06-08-13-19)
Like other new media professionals, VGds also struggle to see beneﬁt in a union
because they have a weak commitment to any particular employer or employment
arrangement (batt, christopherson, rightor & van Jaarsveld, 2001). this is a manifes-
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tation of the project-based industry structure. VGds move frequently from project to
project, team to team, and studio to studio. As such, many do not perceive themselves
as having labour issues that warrant attention because they will not be in that envi-
ronment long enough for it to matter. It is a classic case of Hirschman’s (1970) “exit”
over “voice” response to unfavourable conditions. High mobility across employers
also does not ﬁt with the traditional North American model of enterprise unionism:
… we do change companies a lot, so if you work hard and try to get one
company to implement something and then you just move to the next
one, then you have to work hard to get it done again, so I think that prob-
ably in the long run, it’s better through politics and setting standards on
having something that is more universal. (F-05-20-U-25-06-08-01-07)
besides leaving for another studio, another kind of “exit” response may be found
in the common yearning for creating one’s own independent small-scaled studio. this
trend seems to be building in the industry, driven in part by new technologies to allow
for digital distribution and easier access to market for small developers. However, it
materialized as a growing trend after the 2009 IGdA survey.1 Whether, how and to
what degree this trend is rooted in major structural changes in the industry or in de-
velopers’ longing for autonomy and/or dissatisfaction towards studios that hire them
is a very interesting issue, though far beyond the scope of this article.
returning to the quote above, to address the need for “something that is more
universal,” for some time, unions in the ﬁlm and television industry have promoted
an alternative organizing model in the form of industry- or occupation-wide certiﬁca-
tion. this model ﬁts the ideological frame and working realities of project-based occu-
pational communities (i.e., the actor’s union, the screenwriter’s guild). It allows for
portable rights and beneﬁts and is able to account for freelancer professionals (batt
et al., 2001; Amman, 2002; Legault & d’Amours, 2011). such options for mobilizing or
unionizing may not be well known or well understood among VGds who seem to rely
on a generic notion of industrial unions that legitimately does not ﬁt their realities.
that said, there remain real challenges to work citizenship and representation in the
context of national and international job market mobility (Legault & d’Amours, 2011),
not the least of which is the issue of portable rights when workers are increasingly
being asked to move (carré, 2010). Internationally mobile VGds are well aware of these
challenges and the barriers they pose for local or national systems of collective repre-
sentation or rights: 
Well, the thing I want to emphasize was that the industry is very interna-
tional and it’s a little bit tricky to look at it only in national level … like
people that work for [studio] and then go to [Asia] lose their civil rights,
or people that are from sweden and move … don’t have the same child
care …, but they still have the same family. you know, there’s just so many
things related to people crossing borders constantly. … For me, investing
so much in retirement that I’ll never be able to collect on because it’s part
of a national system … It doesn’t belong to me; really, it’s paying into a
system that will pay back out to me. (F-08-11-I-01-08-08-01-07)
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An equally large barrier to unionization among VGds is the perceived costs of unions.
Like computer programmers (Milton, 2003), many VGds harbour misgivings about
unions, especially the fear of compromising creativity and innovation: 
People talk about VGd unions, but it’s a pipe dream. … the union is kind
of anti-passion … It brings everyone down to the same level, gives everyone
the same working conditions. And in terms of innovation, it would be even
worse than today, I think. It could really put the brakes on ideas and peo-
ple’s commitment … It’s employee commitment that gets a game out. so
if your employees only work from eight to ﬁve, nothing’s going to get done.
Montréal’s reputation is going to suffer. (H-06-16-G-23-07-08-01-07)
Interviewees voiced a plethora of negative anecdotal and second-hand experi-
ences that signify a deep-rooted disinclination toward unions and powerfully reinforce
negative perceptions. traditional or typical union models that protect seniority, sta-
bility and equality, establish job descriptions, and set up pay raises unconnected to in-
dividual merit are perceived as antithetical to learning-oriented meritocracies. Many
contended that it beneﬁts the least ambitious and stiﬂes creativity. these perceptions
are similar to those of computer programmers who feel that union members have
nothing in common with high-tech workers (Milton, 2003).
though this stereotyping can be lamented, its pervasiveness cannot be denied. In
this way the dominant image of industrial unions can blind workers to more accurate
and promising comparisons. As with industry-wide certiﬁcation systems, ﬁlm and televi-
sion unions are again a more useful comparison for new media professionals. the per-
forming arts provide numerous examples of compensation systems within unionized
environments that account for merit through mixed allocations of ﬁxed and variable pay
and allow for “above-scale deals” (Amman, 2002, p. 126-127; Legault & d’Amours, 2011).
Social interaction 
Where Kelly sees social interaction as necessary to build the message and momentum
of a mobilizing drive, as discussed above, social interaction can also reinforce the costs
or negative tendencies toward collective action and unions in particular. returning to
the 2009 QoL survey, employed respondents were asked how they thought the people
at their company would vote in a hypothetical union certiﬁcation. Just over one-quarter
felt that their coworkers would vote against a union, while about 20 percent felt their
coworkers would be in favour of a union (16% said the vote would be split 50-50 for
and against and 38% had no opinion or preferred not to say). When considered in con-
trast to the ﬁgures presented earlier where one-third said that they themselves would
vote in favour, this data shows that workers in the videogame industry perceive more
negativity toward unionization on behalf of their co-workers than actually exists.
Mobility also plays a role in that it can reduce the opportunities to develop the so-
cial fabric required for local collective action. though VGds are connected through an
online community with occasional face-to-face events, constant turnover and team
reorganization: 
reduces the opportunity for repeated cycles of exchange, risk-taking, and
achievement, experiences that would strengthen the willingness of trust-
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ing parties to rely on each other and expand resources brought to the ex-
change. (Milton, 2003, p. 39) 
Without time to build shared experiences of continued unjust or illegitimate treatment
and with the continued thought that somewhere else might be different or better, it
becomes challenging to develop the needed ideology for an “us versus them” framing
of struggle.
And to date, no leaders have emerged from the industry to sufﬁciently unite and
mobilize the myriad of experienced illegitimacies under a common theme for change.
Individual developers have written articles and provided commentary, groups have
pursued class action lawsuits for speciﬁc violations, and roundtables have been held
at conferences, but there has not been lasting leadership. the year 2004 marked a
great deal of interest due to the conﬂagration of a highly popular blog decrying working
conditions at electronic Arts (discussed below), a number of class action lawsuits, and
the launch of the Quality of Life committee within the IGdA; however, the vibrancy
of that movement has ups and downs (Hyman, 2008).
Opportunity – Employer retaliation and alternative action
the power of the employer and fear of reprisal is critical in the decisions of all workers
considering unionization (Godard, 2008). the 2009 QoL survey asked employed re-
spondents about how they thought their studio’s management would react to a union-
ising initiative. A small proportion of the respondents said their managers would
welcome the union (6%) or would not care (11%). one-third preferred not to voice
their opinion on this question. the majority (52%) felt management would oppose
the initiative and 15.5 percent of those felt that management’s opposition would be ag-
gressive and take the form of threats and harassment. In a young population that is
not well informed about their labour rights, this fear could be heightened. Many VGds
maintain anonymity in online posts that are critical of their employer or the industry
in general. this perception is not unfounded:
It’s the problem of being seen as a [trouble-maker]: don’t cause too many
problems because … arbitrarily … ﬁres people sometimes. It just seems that
if it’s at the end of a project and if it’s gone really well, everyone’s safe, but if it
hasn’t, they’ll ﬁre the producer and the designer and someone else. [Without
any explanations?] It happened before and they would just say “we didn’t
work well together,” “work didn’t go fast enough,” “the project didn’t go that
well, it’s your fault.” … Without a warning. (F-10-16-G-26-06-08-01-07)
this example concerns individual reprisals, but they are not the only ones to con-
sider. regardless of the advantages gained from collective actions, they may have a
perverse effect. Following the class action wave in california, electronic Arts transferred
hundreds of developers to Florida and canada, wishing to avoid its new liability to pay
them overtime (Feldman & thorsen, 2004). such a retort can chill a movement and
stall would-be union organizers in a context where the threat of outsourcing always
lies in the background:
A lot of people say, “oh, if the game industry is unionized, it will move to
china, period, and that’s the end of that. they’ll pay people who live to
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work, rather than people who work to live, and … ” you know, they often
tell us it’s impossible to unionize and employers would go elsewhere.
everyone would love to ﬁnd a solution, but no one is very well informed.
(F-03-18-U-13-06-08-01-07)
the discussion so far paints a rather dismal picture of the capacity for VGds to
mobilize under Kelly’s model insofar as mobilizing is conceived as forming a union.
However, there is evidence of discontent and the desire for action, as well as explicit
evidence of VGds coming together in new forms of collective action. over the past 10
years, there have been a number of online campaigns against abusive employers. these
have the advantage of targeting a large audience and protecting the anonymity of ac-
tivists through the use of avatars or taglines. As shirky (2008) argued, social networks
remove two important obstacles to collective action: the limits to circulation of infor-
mation and the constraint of physical gathering to deploy collective expression. the
capacity to instantly and internationally share strategic information and to coordinate
collective action allows for quickly constituting a redoubtable stock of evidence in
cases of media or legal action. the most famous case is the protest against unlimited
unpaid overtime written by a woman “widowed” by her then-ﬁancé’s long hours at
an electronic Arts studio. Her blog as EA Spousewent viral and resulted in thousands
of online comments about VGd working conditions. this built momentum for the ﬁl-
ing of three successful class action lawsuits for unpaid overtime and prompted eA to
change some of its internal practices (Legault & Weststar, 2013; Peticca-Harris, Weststar
& McKenna, in press).
closer to a democracy of the multitude model (Hardt & Negri, 2004) and emblem-
atic of the alter-globalization movement, many VGds reject any transcendental hier-
archy of command in collective action, which collides with well-established union
approaches. they prefer to collectively produce social organization in temporary coali-
tions where the various social actors collaborate instead of being imposed an order by
any external authority. this ethos is embedded in the prior socialisation of a majority
of VGds in gamer communities where players collaborate in massively multi-player
online games and “mod” the source code of games to create new variations of game-
play that are shared (as derived from the collaborative open source movement). to
join issue-based coalitions that disband when no longer needed is a type of job action
that is more consistent with their beliefs; moreover, their skills, resources, and com-
munication channels enable them to form effective issue-based networks (Milton,
2003). the EA Spousemobilization provided VGds with the feeling that “another kind
of job action is possible”—one that is emerging, spontaneous, non-permanent, non-
hierarchical, and controlled by actors themselves.
Part of this belief is poorly based on a context that may change and as such, is
misleading. similar to the threat of exit or more traditional employee voice mecha-
nisms, the power of social media strategies ﬁrst relies on the existence of a so-called
“supplier market.” employers are likely to respond to the publicized concerns to pre-
serve their recruitment and retention in a tight labour market. It also relies on the fact
that many game studios are heavily state-funded and can do without bad publicity.
should this context change, such a strategy would cruelly reveal its weakness.
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As noted above, the IGdA has also relied on peer pressure to promote good be-
haviour. they will release public statements about the importance of good working
conditions when problems are brought to their attention. they also work collabora-
tively with employers to create and enforce industry standards. this approach seems
to align more closely to the identity of many VGds:
there are initiatives like the IGdA that attempt to formalize things like
getting your name in the credits. For example, there are people who’ve
done ﬁfty percent of a game and they don’t get credited … When you
apply for a job, the idea is really there … People will say, “How many titles
have you delivered, how many projects have you worked on?” It’s good
to have your name [in the credits], because your reputation is based on
credits. those standards are developed by the IGdA, for example. It’s a
kind of association, but it’s not a union. (H-12-16-16-A-04-06-08-13-19)
According to our respondents, big studios also have open-door policies, both as
union-prevention strategies and under the inﬂuence of the high-performance work
systems (HPWs) managerial approach (butler, 2009). Within a HPWs, management
actively seeks employee collaboration and commitment by encouraging them to ex-
press their ideas and reducing conﬂict. Many managers allocate about 30 percent of
their time to answering employee questions and solving problems with working con-
ditions. A number of women we interviewed mentioned this was how they obtained
practical arrangements to help balance their personal life and work life.
Under Kelly’s mobilization theory, actions such as collective lawsuits, negotiation
with managers, social media, and the IGdA all represent alternative mechanisms
through which VGds can pursue their claims. In this way, they can act as a hindrance
to more full-ﬂedged mobilization, such as unionization, because they act to diffuse is-
sues over the short-term and reinforce individualized solutions. though some positive
change has come from the above-mentioned initiatives, and the consciousness about
poor working conditions has been raised in the industry, real change has been slow.
the Ubifree movement—where VGds in France attempted to form a virtual union—
was quickly silenced with only cursory appeasements from management, and there
continue to be eA spouse-like outcries online about abusive working conditions at
various studios (Legault & Weststar, 2013). developers themselves comment on the
ﬂeeting nature of these web-based movements and there is growing popular critique
of the ability of social media to promote real engagement and lasting change.
developers easily post a supportive comment on a blog but seem reluctant to engage
more fully to push for real changes.
Discussion and conclusion
this article sought to examine the propensity for videogame developers (VGds) to en-
gage in collective action under the determinants of Kelly’s (1998) mobilization theory.
survey and interview data indicate that VGds have identiﬁed common problems in
their working conditions and some deﬁne these problems as illegitimate. VGds do
identify as an “in-group” through the shared norms, experiences, and values of their
occupational community. However, the model reveals considerable obstacles to col-
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lective action: the problem is not unanimously blamed on employers; VGds are some-
what indifferent to legislative protection; alternative explanations of crunch time are
accepted by many; labour shortages reinforce strong individual employee bargaining
power; and managerial open-door strategies enable them to solve some problems to
their satisfaction. When individual or collective action are equally likely to resolve is-
sues, the former may be the most efﬁcient because it does not have coordination costs.
VGds already work long hours and juggling priorities are only likely to coalesce when
they believe that collective efforts will be successful and they cannot achieve the same
results by acting alone. After all, many feel that they already have voice within their
organizations and that their employers will be responsive to their individual requests.
there are also organizational obstacles to traditional union action. the group con-
sidered in Kelly’s model is stable and locally deﬁned. In the case of VGds, the in-group
exists, but it is not employer-based; it is mobile and deﬁned internationally by mem-
bership in the industry and the occupation. What is worse, the mobility of VGds re-
duces the beneﬁts of strictly local action, for which they pay the price without enjoying
the results. therefore, unionization through the usual enterprise-based certiﬁcation
system has very few advantages. As well, the hiring and compensation system is based
on reputation, with a clear emphasis on the recent portfolio. the inherent meritocracy
among VGds conﬂicts with an egalitarian union ideology. these last two obstacles
limit the ability to mobilize workers by limiting the potential gains.
Industry-based certiﬁcation is an alternative avenue in both cases: it enables work-
ers to enjoy beneﬁts throughout the industry anywhere in the country, and North
American industry-based certiﬁcation for artists demonstrates the possibility of sys-
tems that use a mix of ﬁxed compensation and variable merit pay. though these “old
media” union models in their current form are quite suitable for new media industries
(Amman, 2002), it is important to note that these entertainment unions formed and
gained their foothold in a different environmental context, one of few employers, high
vertical integration of ﬁrms, extreme geographical clustering in Hollywood, and in a
time of growing labour power (Gray & seeber, 1996). these unions have maintained
relevance because they have done much to adapt to meet the restructuring and tech-
nological changes of their industries, but they also owe some success to their historical
presence. this legacy and favourable labour context does not exist for the videogame
industry. VGds are fearful of reprisals by local employers and signiﬁcant stakeholders
because venture capital has already demonstrated that it is extremely mobile. VGds
take the prospect of operations shifting to another country seriously and that under-
mines their belief in possible change through unionization. As well, even industry cer-
tiﬁcation systems do not protect internationally mobile VGds.
In short we see a group that holds a collective consciousness and is prepared to
engage in forms of mobilization, but not in the univocal manner of traditional enter-
prise-based unionism. therefore it is important to question Kelly’s conﬂation of col-
lective action with union action, and of union action with Wagner-era industrial unions
(Kelly, 1998). In the project-based organizations of the knowledge economy, of which
videogame development is just one example, the conditions can be hospitable to col-
lective action, but the usual enterprise-based union certiﬁcation system is poorly suited
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to the structure of the industry and to workers’ most pressing problems. the primary
effect of these structural changes is not to make collective action obsolete, but to make
the traditional model of unionization less attractive.
VGds perceive common interests among all workers in the industry, including
self-employed workers and consultants, because their precarious status often draws
them close to employees, especially with respect to intellectual property, and because
they often alternate between contractor and employee status (Haiven, 2006). While
unions may be reluctant to engage in individualized bargaining or similar services,
and to lead organizing campaigns that are far more expensive, those that wish to or-
ganize and keep members will ﬁnd they have to do it. In fact, a “new craft unionism”
may be needed to meet the new exigencies of the employment market (Haiven, 2006,
p. 111; see also stone, 2004), taking the union outside the boundaries of traditional col-
lective bargaining and the National Labor relations Act template because whole areas
of our economy will not play by those rules.
Unions in the movie industry have adopted trade-based rather than employer-
based practices and such seems to be the need—if not the wish—in the new media
arena (Amman, 2002), as these could better ﬁt the videogame industry. but more
deeply, opting for alternative modes of collective action may suggest that unions face
a demand for a change in their purpose and use. In a new project-based context, there
is space to reconsider some well-established norms embedded in the general union-
ization model including enterprise-based certiﬁcation and the centralized decision-
making processes that drive bargaining processes and job actions, among others. both
unions and mobilization theories that explain their outreach need to account for struc-
tural economic changes that do not make collective action obsolete, but rather call for
a change.
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